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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
a notice of intention to arbitrate to apply for a stay within the statu-
tory period concedes not only the arbitrability of the controversy but
also the adversary's choice of arbitrator.
Also reported are selected amendments to the CPLR and a sig-
nificant addition to the Judiciary Law which allows administrative
vacatur of improperly obtained default judgments.
The reader may have noticed that the Survey has a new title, which
eliminates "Quarterly" from the former one. The reason for this change
is that the Survey will no longer appear in all four issues of each
volume; henceforth, the December issue will be devoted entirely to
the Second Circuit Note.
The Survey sets forth in each installment those cases which are
deemed to make the most significant contribution to New York's pro-
cedural law. Due to limitations of space, however, many other less im-
portant, but, nevertheless, significant cases cannot be included. While
few cases are exhaustively discussed, it is hoped that the Survey accom-
plishes its basic purpose, viz., to key the practitioner to significant
developments in the procedural law of New York.
ARTicLE 2 - LIMITATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 202: Court applies liberal test of residency for borrowing statute
purposes where plaintiff was en route to permanent domicile in New
York at time cause of action accrued.
When a cause of action accrues without the state, the borrowing
statute prescribes the time within which it must be brought. The statute
provides that a non-resident plaintiff's action will be time-barred in
New York if the limitations period of either New York or the state of
accrual has expired.' The resident plaintiff is favored in that his action
need only be timely under the New York limitations period. The test
of residency for borrowing statute purposes has been strict.2 The courts
have denied the favored resident status to plaintiffs who became New
York residents only after their actions had accrued.3 An additional
1 CPLR 202. See, e.g., Daigle v. Leavitt, 54 Misc. 2d 651, 283 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct.
Rockland County 1967); Burnis v. Alexander, 51 Misc. 2d 543, 273 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1966).
2 One example is American Lumberman Mut. Cas. Co. v. Cochrane, 129 N.Y.S.2d 489
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954), affd mem., 284 App. Div. 884, 134 N.Y.S32d 473 (1st Dep't
1954), aff'd mem., 309 N.Y. 1017, 133 N.E.2d 461 (1956), discussed in Lindsay, Statute of
Limitations-Licensed Foreign Corporation Held Non-Resident Under CPA 13, 4 BurrALo
L. REv. 363 (1955), wherein a foreign corporation qualified to do business in New York
was held to be a non-resident for borrowing statute purposes.
3 See Cellura v. Cellura, 24 App. Div. 2d 59, 263 N.Y.S.2d 843 (4th Dep't 1965), dis-
cussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 128, 131 (1967); Oglesby v. Cranwell,
250 App. Div. 720, 293 N.Y.S. 67 (2d Dep't 1937) (per curiam) (construing CPA 13).
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stricture was imposed when "resident" was recently construed as
synonomous with "domiciliary. ' 4
In Jones v. Greyhound Bus Lines,5 the Supreme Court, Orange
County, applied a more generous test of residency in a borrowing
statute case. The plaintiff was riding in the defendant's bus to a new
residence in New York when she was injured in Virginia in a traffic
accident. She had completely given up her Florida domicile and had
rented an apartment in New York to which most of her possessions had
already been transported by a friend. After the accident, she proceeded
to the New York apartment where she resided continuously to the date
of the action. She commenced an action for personal injury two years
and eleven months after the accident, within the New York three year
limitation period6 but after the Virginia two year period 7 had elapsed.
While recognizing that under established principles of law, the plaintiff
was not a New York domiciliary at the time her cause of action ac-
crued," the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the action
as time-barred under the Virginia two year statute of limitations and
the borrowing statute. The court reasoned that, in light of the unique
circumstances of the case, "to mechanically apply the statute ... when
there is no question of forum shopping and no evidence of prejudice
to defendant would be unjust and contrary to the Legislative intent."9
In distinguishing previous cases wherein contrary results were reached0
the court deemed important the plaintiff's previously established con-
tacts with New York and her complete renunciation of her former
domicile. These factors clearly indicated a pre-existing intent to be-
4 Banasik v. Reed Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 34 App. Div. 2d 746, 310
N.Y.S.2d 127 (1st Dep't 1970) (mem.), af'd mem., 28 N.Y.2d 770, 269 N.E.2d 918, 321
N.Y.S.2d 376 (1971). "Residence" generally requires merely dwelling at a specified place
whereas "domicile" requires both dwelling at a specified place and an intent to make that
place a fixed and permanent home. Isaacson v. Heffernan, 189 Misc. 16, 64 N.Y.S.2d 726
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1946).
5 73 Misc. 2d 109, 341 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1973).
6 CPLR 214(5).
7 VA. Con. ANN. § 8-24 (1950), as amended (Supp. 1973).
873 Misc. 2d at 111, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 161, quoting 17 N. Y. Jun., Domicile and Resi-
dence § 26 (1961) (rhe "domicil of one who is in itinere from an old to a new home
continues to be the old domicil until the new is reached"). The court also cited Colorado
v. Harbeck, 189 App. Div. 865, 179 N.Y.S. 510 (Ist Dep't 1919), rev'd on other grounds,
232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921).
9 73 Misc. 2d at 111, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
loIn Banasik v. Reed Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 34 App. Div. 2d 746, 310
N.Y.S.2d 127 (1st Dep't 1970) (mem.), af'd mem., 28 N.Y.2d 770, 269 N.E.2d 918, 321
N.Y.S.2d 376 (1971), the plaintiff resided in Rhode Island when her cause of action accrued
and for a period of time thereafter. Additionally, she had given Rhode Island as her
address on several occasions. In Cellura v. Cellura, 24 App. Div. 2d 59, 263 N.Y.S.2d 843
(4th Dep't 1965), the plaintiff had no contacts with New York prior to the accrual of
the action.
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come a New York resident, thus precluding the possibility that the
plaintiff was forum shopping.."
The Jones decision is a laudable departure from the strict resi-
dency test. CPLR 202 seeks to protect New York residents from injus-
tice by exempting them from the bar of foreign and probably unfamiliar
limitation periods. Clearly this exemption should extend to the plain-
tiff in Jones who had no contacts with the state where she was injured
and became a New York resident immediately after her cause of action
accrued. The court's stress on the unique circumstances present should
prevent the decision from being used as a precedent for forum shopping.
CPLR 202: Court examines "place of accrual" concept under the bor-
rowing statute.
Under New York's borrowing statute,'12 a cause of action accruing
without the state, when sued upon by a non-resident plaintiff, is time-
barred if the statute of limitations of either New York or the jurisdic-
tion wherein the cause of action accrued has expired. The facts of
Sack v. Low,18 a case recently decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, illustrate unresolved issues with respect to the borrow-
ing statute.
In Sack, the plaintiffs, residents of Massachusetts, brought an action
for alleged federal securities violations against a New York-based
brokerage firm. The District Court for the Southern District of New
York had dismissed the action on the theory that a previous dismissal
of an identical suit involving the same parties by the District Court of
Massachusetts on statute of limitations grounds was a decision on the
merits and thus operated as a res judicata bar. In vacating the district
court's order, the Second Circuit held that the Massachusetts court's
adjudication with respect to the statute of limitations was not on the
merits. In the absence of an applicable federal statute of limitations,
the Second Circuit was then obliged to determine whether the action
was time-barred under New York limitations laws.' 4 Finding the record
11 The borrowing statute is designed to prevent forum shopping by non-resident
plaintiffs seeking to take advantage of longer New York limitation periods. See 1 WK&M
202.01; 7B McKnmN~y's CPLR 202, commentary at 81 (1972).
12 CPLR 202:
An action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state cannot be com-
menced after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of either the state or
the place without the state where the cause of action accrued, except that where
the cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of the state the time limited by
the laws of the state shall apply.
18 478 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1973).
14 Id. at 365, citing UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 883 U.S. 696 (1966); Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
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